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training—though it hasn’t been directly tested, most MT-Granon, S., Passetti, F., Thomas, K.L., Dalley, J.W., Everitt, B.J., and
ologists would say that the neurons are every bit asRobbins, T.W. (2000). J. Neurosci. 20, 1208–1215.
informative about the stimulus on day 1, when the mon-Kentros, C.G., Agnihotri, N.T., Streater, S., Hawkins, R.D., and Kan-
key is clueless, as they are on day 100, when the monkeydel, E.R. (2004). Neuron 42, this issue, 283–295.
is an expert at the task. It appears that the stimulus-Markus, E.J., Qin, Y.L., Leonard, B., Skaggs, W.E., McNaughton,
derived information the monkey needs to solve the taskB.L., and Barnes, C.A. (1995). J. Neurosci. 15, 7079–7094.
is present in his brain from the beginning. Thus, muchMcGaughy, J., and Sarter, M. (1995). Psychopharmacology (Berl.)
117, 340–357. of what must be occurring in his brain during those long
weeks of training is the decision circuits “figuring out”Miller, E.K., and Cohen, J.D. (2001). Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24,
167–202. which MT neurons to listen to for a given configuration
O’Keefe, J., and Conway, D.H. (1978). Exp. Brain Res. 31, 573–590. of the task—i.e., changes in connections. How does the
monkey’s brain do this?O’Keefe, J., and Nadel, L. (1978). The Hippocampus as a Cognitive
Map (Oxford: Clarendon Press). Answering this question is key to understanding one
Quirk, G.J., Muller, R.U., and Kubie, J.L. (1990). J. Neurosci. 10, of the most interesting things that brains do: making
2008–2017. decisions. For the student of brain decisions, it requires
first learning which particular sensory neurons are
tapped for the decisions so that he or she may then ask
how the sensory signals are combined and how they
come to efficiently communicate with the decision cir-Taking Strategies to Task cuits.
For a typical experiment of the sort described above,
the decision scientist compares three different kinds of
information: (1) the visual stimulus displayed, (2) theIn this issue of Neuron, Uka and DeAngelis report a
action potentials (spikes) produced by one or more neu-neural signature of the strategy that monkeys’ brains
rons recorded during the task, and (3) the animal’sdeveloped to solve a visual discrimination task by
choices (e.g., “right” or “left”). By analyzing the relation-training them on one version of the task and testing
ship between visual stimulus and spikes, one can com-them on another. Extensive training on one version
pute a measure of how informative a given neuron is
caused decision networks in the animals’ brains to
about some critical feature of the stimulus. For trials
ignore certain classes of neurons whose signals would on which the stimulus is weak or ambiguous, one can
have been useful on the modified version of the task analyze the relationship between spikes and choices to
used to test them. learn how informative the neuron’s spikes are about the
monkey’s decision. The latter is often referred to as
If you need advice on how to fix a leaky faucet, you call “choice probability,” and it can be thought of as a mea-
a plumber rather than a florist. This is common sense. sure of the extent to which the decision networks in
But how do you know that it is a plumber that possesses the monkey’s brain are using that neuron’s spikes—or
this expertise, and how do you locate the plumber? others with which that neuron is correlated—to arrive
Again, this seems easy, but only because brains and at the final choice. This is a potent metric, since knowing
societies have developed effective strategies to solve what kinds of neurons the decision networks are “lis-
these problems. In fact, how various pockets of exper- tening to” can be used to infer the nature of the strategy
tise are discovered, categorized, and stored for future the brain is using to solve the task.
use is a rather challenging problem. This approach was pioneered by Newsome and his
How do populations of neurons interact to solve this colleagues at Stanford (Newsome et al., 1989; Britten et
kind of problem? Consider the following task: you are al., 1992, 1996). DeAngelis, one of Newsome’s scientific
given a noisy visual display that contains moving dots, progeny, now has applied a clever variation on this
and you have to report in which direction it is moving: theme to suggest an interesting approach to studying
right or left. Now, imagine you are a neuron or a small the brain circuitry underlying task strategy. Uka and
circuit of neurons, a few in a sea of billions, and you DeAngelis (this issue of Neuron) trained monkeys on a
similar two-choice discrimination task in which the ani-must make the final choice as to whether to look to the
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Figure 1. Task Strategy for a Two-Alternative
Forced Choice Depth Discrimination
mal had to decide whether a field of dots was nearer to during this task, however, the authors modified the task
slightly so that it was optimized for the neuron fromor farther than a reference point. The only available vi-
sual cues that the monkey had to make his choices were which they were recording. Thus, if they happened to
be recording from a tuned excitatory neuron, they chosethe relative positions in the two eyes of some of the
dots in the stimulus—a cue referred to as “binocular one stimulus to be a very good stimulus for the neu-
ron—say, just on the near side of zero disparity—anddisparity.” Previously, the DeAngelis lab had shown that
MT neurons are both sensitive to such cues and that one to be a poor stimulus, such as a very far disparity.
In this case, the responses of the neuron were highlythey are used by monkeys to solve the task (DeAngelis
et al., 1998; Uka and DeAngelis, 2003). But which neu- informative about the two possible stimuli. Common
sense would dictate that the signals be used, and previ-rons and under what circumstances?
It turns out that different MT neurons have qualitatively ous studies have found that monkey decision circuits
do indeed tend to give greater weight to the most highlydifferent response profiles—referred to as “tuning
curves”—to visual stimuli containing binocular disparity informative neurons (Britten et al., 1996; Parker et al.,
2002). In this case, however, Uka and DeAngelis foundinformation. Some have tuning curves that are symmetri-
cal with respect to the plane of fixation. For example, a that neurons with symmetrical disparity tuning curves
were pretty much ignored—i.e., they had low choiceneuron of the kind known as “tuned excitatory” re-
sponds maximally to stimuli at the same depth as the probabilities—regardless of their relevance to the task
at hand. It was as if, during all those months of training,point of fixation but respond progressively less well to
stimuli that are either nearer to or farther than this point. the monkey’s brain had learned to ignore neurons with
symmetrical tuning curves, and he could not changeOther neurons, however, have very asymmetrical tuning
curves and might respond vigorously to stimuli any- this strategy on the fly.
This observation provokes a number of questions.where behind the fixation plane but very poorly to those
anywhere in front of it. This would be classified as a Was the monkey’s performance notably worse for the
new, asymmetrical task? Uka and DeAngelis found that“far” neuron, and its inverse as a “near” neuron.
In the study reported in this issue of Neuron, Uka and this was not the case, presumably because the original
strategy of comparing pools of far and near tuned neu-DeAngelis (2004) trained the monkeys initially using only
symmetrical pairs of disparity stimuli. That is, the mon- rons still worked. But at some point this strategy could
be made to break down. One wonders how their mon-key always had to discriminate between two stimuli that
were nearer or farther by an equal amount. Over several keys would have performed if both stimuli were made
to lie on the same side of the fixation plane—a case formonths, they became experts at solving this symmetri-
cal task. It is quite easy to see that a “tuned excitatory” which the near versus far strategy would fail. Assuming
this would make the monkey’s performance worse, atneuron would not be very useful for solving such a task,
since it will give roughly equal firing rates to the two least initially, if the potentially highly informative neuron
could be recorded from while the monkey masteredpossible visual stimuli. A more sensible strategy would
be to compare the outputs of the near and far neurons this new task, would the neuron’s choice probability
increase over time? And, if so, over what length of time—and to ignore the symmetrically tuned neurons alto-
gether (Figure 1). hours? days? weeks? Presumably, the answers to such
questions would shed light on the plasticity mechanismsWhen it was time to examine responses of MT neurons
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that underlie the acquisition of new strategies. With such
a hook into the system, one could then imagine using
techniques such as antidromic activation to monitor the
underlying changes in connectivity that must be oc-
curring.
Another interesting feature of Uka and DeAngelis’s
result is that it argues for a “bottom-up” implementation
of task strategy—as has been implicit in most of the
preceding discussion—rather than a “top-down” influ-
ence of feedback from the decision networks them-
selves. They found that subtle variations in the animal’s
performance over time were correlated with similar fluc-
tuations in the sensitivity of single neurons and that
this coupling was strongest for those neurons with the
highest choice probability. In other words, the monkey’s
decision networks, through training, had become more
or less hardwired to a particular group of low-level neu-
rons, and as these neurons performed, so performed
the monkey. As noted above, this hints strongly at where
in the visual pathways one might start to look for such
changes in wiring.
The results of Uka and DeAngelis have indicated just
how potentially powerful measurements of choice prob-
ability can be about how a monkey’s brain is solving a
particular task. And they point the way to potentially
more incisive experiments in which the experimenter
monitors dynamic changes in choice probability while
animals are confronted with specific variations on pre-
viously learned tasks. While the ultimate elucidation of
the means by which animal brains form neural strategies
will require many more experiments, the findings of Uka
and DeAngelis suggest an interesting strategy for this
task.
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